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1 Introduction
Analysis of investor–entrepreneur relations with the theory of contracts has provided important
insight in recent years. In such models whenever it can be assumed that the entrepreneur has more
control over the implementation of the project than the investor does, the following observation can
be justified: when agency problems increase, entrepreneurs have more options to manipulate the
operation of the project to their advantage.
This study presents an investor–entrepreneur model with collusion between the entrepreneur
and the agent operating the project. The entrepreneur has the ability to influence the workings of
the project via hidden arrangements.
Our model builds upon a two principal, one agent version of the one in Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991). The first and wealth-constrained principal, the entrepreneur, is risk-neutral and possesses
an asset/project, but lacks the required startup capital and needs to employ a risk-averse agent
(manager) to operate it. The critical feature of our model is that the project renders two dimensional
verifiable and non-divertable returns, which can be interpreted respectively as money and power.
Naturally, the technology is such that money and power are substitutes.
The entrepreneur can obtain the startup capital from an investor (the second, risk-neutral and
non-wealth-constrained principal), who must be paid off from the returns of the project. In order
to do that, the entrepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor, and this offer consists
of a contract, a feasible monetary compensation scheme and shares of the project.1 If possible an
easy method of compensating the investor is to pay back the startup capital (possibly with interest)
from the monetary returns of the project. However, when the monetary returns do not suffice, then
the entrepreneur also has to give some portion of the project to the investor.2 This arrangement,
then, gives birth to non-trivial strategic interactions between the investor and the entrepreneur.
Indeed, we assume that the entrepreneur and the investor do not view the two dimensional
returns the same, that is, their priorities over money and power differ. The fact that investors and
1Our model contains only one investor. Yet, due to the entrepreneur making a take-it-or-leave-it offer, our model
can be interpreted as one in which there are many competing investors. This is because, in both of these formulations
the results will not change due to the investor(s) not obtaining any additional surplus.
2The act of giving some portion of the project to the investor in exchange for the startup capital can be seen
as the entrepreneur selling some of his shares. The price at which this transaction occurs can be derived from our
results characterizing the optimal contracts between the entrepreneur and the investor, namely Propositions 1 and
3.
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entrepreneurs might have different objectives is a well known phenomenon and needs mentioning at
this point. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discusses “some major conglomerates, whose
founders built vast empires without returning much to investors”.
In our model, the monetary returns are transferable, but the second return (power) is not.
The only way for the entrepreneur to transfer some of the second return is by giving the investor
some shares of the project. Moreover, we assume that the entrepreneur assigns a higher value to
the second return than the investor does. In particular, both of the principals’ payoff functions
aggregate the expected returns in a linear fashion, where the difference between the two is due to
entrepreneur’s coefficient for power being strictly higher than that of the investor.
There are two technical assumptions for the derivation of our results. Assumption 1 ensures that
it is strictly beneficial for the investor to own the whole project while the entrepreneur cannot ma-
nipulate the agent. It should be pointed out that under this assumption the set of feasible contracts
(between the entrepreneur and the investor) which makes both principals willing to participate is
non-empty. Assumption 2 guarantees the participation constraint of the second principal.
As mentioned above, when the monetary returns from the project do not suffice to pay back the
startup capital, the investor must be given some shares of the project. Consequently, he has a say
in the arrangement/allocation of the resources on the two dimensional returns for this project. The
process of deciding which arrangement to choose is modeled with a utilitarian bargaining problem
between investor and entrepreneur, where their bargaining weights are given by the fraction of the
project they own.3
Therefore, when the entrepreneur can commit to honor the outcome of the bargaining process
between him and the investor,4 the entrepreneur offers the optimal (incentive compatible and indi-
vidually rational) contract to the agent that ensures the implementation of the allocation determined
by the bargaining process. However, when such a commitment is impossible, the entrepreneur has
an opportunity to have the agent implement another arrangement via a secret side contract be-
tween the agent and the entrepreneur. That is, in the no-commitment case the entrepreneur and
the agent may collude, and this leads to an agency problem which is in the same spirit as those in
the renegotiation proofness of Maskin and Moore (1999), and the collusion proofness of Laffont and
3We refer the reader to Thomson (1981) for more on utilitarian bargaining problems.
4Alternatively, the investor perfectly observes all interaction between entrepreneur and agent.
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Martimort (2000).
We show that the optimal contract between the investor and the entrepreneur is not immune
to collusion. Furthermore, characterizations of the optimal contracts in both commitment and
no-commitment cases are provided. Based on those characterizations, we investigate the effect of
collusion on investor’s share of the project. We show the existence of cases where this share increase
and decrease. Moreover, in both commitment and collusion the associated optimal contracts make
the entrepreneur obtain strictly positive payoffs, while the investor is not given any additional
surplus.
When the entrepreneur may collude with the agent, he has the opportunity to offer a hidden side
contract to the agent. Hence, it must be that the investor is not paying any of the resulting additional
costs, because otherwise he would become aware of this arrangement. Thus, the entrepreneur’s
benefit of collusion with the agent consists of the collection of additional returns from determining
the allocation of resources on his own. Meanwhile, the entrepreneur’s cost of collusion is due
to him being restricted to pay all the additional costs on his own. Then, we prove that in the
no-commitment case the investor (considering the entrepreneur’s offer) knows the following: the
entrepreneur will make sure that the project will be implemented with a weight (on market share)
strictly lower than the one obtained from the bargaining between the two. That is, with collusion
the entrepreneur is able to divert the payments that were supposed to be made to the agent, by
making him work at an arrangement different than the one agreed by the investor.
Zingales (1994) and Barca (1995) provide some partial empirical support for our conclusions.
Indeed they conclude that managers in Italy (whom are to be interpreted as the entrepreneurs in
our setting) have significant opportunities to divert profits to themselves and not share them with
shareholders uninvolved in the companies’ operations.
Our model can be applied to shareholding by commercial banks, a topic of recent interest. In
our model, the investor can be interpreted as a bank, providing funds, and it is not difficult to
imagine that the bank/investor has little expertise on the particular field of the project. It should
be noted that while in some countries, such as the USA, shareholding is prohibited, while in others
such as Japan, Norway, and Canada banks are allowed to own equities of firms up to a certain legal
limit. Santos (1999) reports that
This limit is 50 percent in Norway; 25 percent in Portugal; 10 percent in Canada and
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Finland; 5 percent in Belgium, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden; and zero percent
in the United States, because U.S. commercial banks are not allowed to invest in equity.
Germany and Switzerland are examples of countries where banks’ investments in equity
are not limited by that form of regulation.
Moreover, Flath (1993) examines the situation in Japan reports that “largest debtholders ...[among
Japanese banks] hold more stock if the firms ... [are more] prone to the agency problems of debt ...”.
James (1995) specifies conditions where banks are willing to own equity. It should be mentioned
that Santos (1999) argues that ”equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase
the bank’s stability”.
We specify a condition, Assumption 2, which must be satisfied in order that the credit market
form. In cases where this specification is not fulfilled, the investor does not have any incentives to
provide the necessary funding regardless of the amount of shares offered to him. Hence, we provide
a necessary condition for the participation constraint of the investor.
For the rest of the section, we wish to discuss some aspects of our model in more detail. First
of all, it is imperative to stress that in our model collusion occurs between the entrepreneur and
the agent. Hence, unlike the situation in Itoh (1991), Laffont and Martimort (2000), Laffont and
Martimort (1997) and Barlo (2006), in this study collusion is not an ingredient of the strategic
interaction among agents. Rather, it shares the same spirit as the renegotiation proofness of Maskin
and Moore (1999), because the entrepreneur is restricted to offer contracts which are immune to
his intervention in the later stages of the game.
The second point we wish to emphasize is about the structure of our model. We borrow the
basic model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in which attention is restricted to CARA utilities
(for the agent), normally distributed returns and linear contracts. 5 Our modifications consist of
using two principals (instead of only one), and solving the interaction between the two principals
with utilitarian bargaining in the commitment case, and incorporating collusion between one of the
principals and the agent into this setting. Moreover, we need to mention that dispensing with the
5The reader may need to be reminded that the pioneering model in this field is given in Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987). This research was followed by Schattler and Sung (1993) and Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) who provided
important extensions. Those studies feature repeated agency settings in which the lack of income effects (due to
exponential utility functions) are employed to show the optimality of linear contracts. Lafontaine (1992) and Slade
(1996), on the other hand, provide empirical evidence for the use of linear contracts.
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agent in this model is a possibility, yet, we believe keeping the agent as a part of the analysis is
more appealing in terms of applications.
The third and final aspect that we wish to discuss concerns principal’s benefit functions. As
mentioned above, we assume that both principals’ returns are not transferable. On the other hand,
the monetary returns from the project can be transferred without any frictions, yet, the only way
to transfer utility using the second return involves transfer of shares. Moreover, we assume that
each principals aggregate the expected two dimensional returns linearly, and the only difference
between the two arises due to the multiplier of power. We argue that this form essentially captures
the inherent distinction between an entrepreneur and an investor, and also allows us to come up
with a clear presentation. Therefore, using these observations an alternative interpretation for the
two types of returns in our model can be given as follows: let the first return be the immediate
monetary ones, and the second be the “market share” of the project. Assuming that the level of
personal authority that the entrepreneur derives from the project is not transferable and increases
with market share, suffices for our purposes. It should be pointed out that this last assumption
is consistent with our interpretation of the identities of the principals. Indeed, we think of the
entrepreneur to be someone who is associated in the area of the project and has an “idea” but not
the cash, and the investor to be a financial intermediary whose first priority is monetary, which is
potentially followed by his investments’ market shares.
Section 2 develops the model with commitment: Proposition 1 characterizes its solution. In
section 3 we extend the model to capture collusion between the entrepreneur and the agent, and in
Proposition 2 we show that the commitment contract (between the entrepreneur and the investor) is
not immune to collusion. Moreover, Proposition 3 characterizes the solution in the no-commitment
case. Finally, Theorem 1 displays that the share of the investor is higher when there is collusion.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model With Commitment
We will consider a linear, two–principal, single–agent, and two–task hidden–action model with
state–contingent, observable and verifiable two–dimensional returns. Indeed it builds upon a two
principal version of the one presented in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), and we will keep their
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notation.
Principal 1, the entrepreneur, owns an asset which requires a capital fixed cost of K > 0, and an
agent. If operated, this asset delivers two–dimensional, state–contingent, observable and verifiable
returns drawn from a normal distribution whose covariance matrix is assumed to be fixed. Through
out this study, it is useful to assume that the first dimension of the returns is monetary, and the
second related to individual power. Principal 1 does not possess the required capital investment
of K, but has the option of obtaining it from principal 2, the investor; by paying him a fixed
compensation R, and possibly making principal 2 be a partner with a share (1−ρ), where ρ ∈ [0, 1]
be the share of principal 1. Both of the principals are risk-neutral, and evaluate the two dimensional
returns as follows: Given an expected monetary and power return b = (b1, b2), the gross benefits
(not including the costs of operating the project) to principal i is given by ρi(b1 + λib2), where
ρ1 = ρ, ρ2 = (1 − ρ), and λi > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that λ1 > λ2. Moreover,
given (ρ,R), the two principals will be involved in a utilitarian bargaining where each of them has
a bargaining power given by the share of the project they possess.
After determining the nature of the point that they want to implement, they will seek to employ
an agent, who has CARA utilities. Furthermore, the mean of the two–dimensional returns is
determined by the employee’s effort choice, which none of the principals can observe or verify.
Hence, any contract to be offered cannot depend on agent’s effort choice.
In summary, the timing of the game is as follows:
t = 1 : Principal 1 offers (ρ,R) to principal 2 for him to supply K, and principal 2 accepts or rejects.
If principal 2 rejects the offer, the game ends and both principals get a payoff of 0; otherwise,
it continues.
t = 2 : With bargaining weights given by their share of the project, the principals bargain over the
feasible allocation of resources for the project. This determines a level of λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] that the
principals have agreed upon.
t = 3 : Given λ¯, the principals determine the optimal contract, and the entrepreneur offers it to the
agent;
t = 4 : The agent chooses whether or not he should accept the offer, and exert the effort level the
principals would like him to. Then, the observable and verifiable (by all) state is realized.
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t = 5 : The entrepreneur makes the payments to the agent, and all of them are both observable and
verifiable by the investor.
2.1 Agent’s Problem
The agent determines a vector of efforts t ∈ <2+. The monetary and private cost of effort is given
by C : <2+ → <+. We assume that C(t1, t2) = k1t
2
1
2
+
k2t22
2
, where k1, k2 are both strictly positive
real numbers. We should note that C as defined above is a continuous and strictly convex function.
Once t is determined, the returns are distributed with a two–dimensional normal distribution with
mean
µ(t) =
 µ1(t1)
µ2(t2)
 =
 γ1t1
γ2t2
 . (1)
It should be noticed that µ : <2+ → <2 is a continuous and concave function of t. The agent’s
effort choice creates a two–dimensional signal of information, x ∈ <2, observable and verifiable by
the two principals. x is given by x = µ(t) + ², where ² is normally distributed with mean zero and
covariance matrix
Σ =
 σ21 0
0 σ22
 .
The agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions, with a given CARA
coefficient of r ∈ <++. That is for w ∈ <, u(w) = −e−rw. Under a compensation scheme w : <2 →
<, where w(x) is often to be referred to as the wage at information signal x, the agent’s expected
utility is given by u(CE) =
∫ +∞
−∞ − exp{−r(w(x) − C(t))}dx, where CE denotes the certainty
equivalent money payoff of the agent under the compensation scheme w. Moreover, the reserve
certainty equivalent figure of the agent is normalized to 0.
We restrict attention to linear compensation rules of the form w(x) = αTx+ β, where α ∈ <2+,
and β ∈ <. Making use of the CARA utilities and the normal distribution, it is easy to show that
under our formulation the certainty equivalent of such a compensation scheme is
CE = (α1γ1t1 + α2γ2t2)−
(
k1t
2
1
2
+
k2t
2
2
2
)
− 1
2
r
(
α21σ
2
1 + α
2
2σ
2
2
)
+ β.
Consequently, by considering the first order conditions it is straightforward to see that given a linear
compensation scheme, agent’s optimal choice of effort is
t∗` =
γ`α`
k`
, (2)
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` = 1, 2.
2.2 Optimal Offer To The Agent
The expected gross benefits from the project of principal i, i = 1, 2; is given by Bi(t). As we
mentioned above, we let Bi(t) = µ1(t1) + λi µ2(t2), where λi > 0 for i = 1, 2.
At this stage it is useful to come back to the initial phase of the game. As mentioned above,
first the principals will bargain to determine the weight λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] (recall that we have assumed
without loss of generality that λ1 > λ2) to be used when the optimal contact is to be formulated.
After agreeing on λ¯, principal i’s problem is
max
α,β
ρi
(
µ1(t1) + λ¯µ2(t2)− C(t)− 1
2
r
(
α21σ
2
1 + α
2
2σ
2
2
))
(3)
subject to (2), because while collecting ρi portion of the returns, principal i has to pay also ρi
portion of the costs as well. Therefore, after agreeing on λ¯, the incentives of the two principals
are perfectly aligned; or formally, the solution to (3), is the same as the solution to the following
(aggregated) maximization problem
max
α,β
(
µ1(t1) + λ¯µ2(t2)− C(t)− 1
2
r
(
α21σ
2
1 + α
2
2σ
2
2
))
(4)
By Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) we know that the optimal contract would not render any
excess surplus to the agent. Thus, the optimal constant intercept, β∗, (which does not affect
incentives due to lack of income effects thanks to CARA utility function) must be such that, at
the optimal contract CE = 0. (Recall that the reserve certainty equivalent figure of the agent is
normalized to 0.)
Working with first order conditions to solve the principals’ problem, one can show that α∗1 and
α∗2 are given as follows
α∗1 =
γ21
k1
γ21
k1
+ rσ21
, (5)
and
α∗2 =
γ22
k2
γ22
k2
+ rσ22
λ¯ . (6)
Now, substituting equations 5 and 6, into equation 2, and using 1, it can be obtained that when
the principals agree on λ¯, the project will deliver the following net benefit to principal i when
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λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] is implemented:
Πi(λ¯) =
1
2
Φ1 + λ¯
(
λi − 1
2
λ¯
)
Φ2, (7)
where
Φ` =
(
γ2`
k`
)2
γ2`
k`
+ rσ2`
, (8)
` = 1, 2.
Lemma 1 The following hold for Πi : [λ2, λ1]→ <, i = 1, 2:
1. For all λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1], Π1(λ¯)− Π2(λ¯) = λ¯(λ1−λ2)Φ2 > 0;
2. Πi is strictly increasing for λˆ < λi, and strictly decreasing for λˆ > λi; and,
3. Πi is strictly concave on (0, 1), and ∂Πi(λ¯)/∂ λ¯ evaluated at λ¯ = λi equals 0.
Proof. While the first conclusion follows from employing equation (7), the others are due to
the derivative of Πi(λ¯) being given by
∂Πi
∂ λ¯
= Φ2 (λi − λ) . (9)
Thus, in order to guarantee the non-emptiness of the participation constraint of principal 1, the
following technical assumption is needed:
Assumption 1 The following holds:
1
2
(λ2)
2Φ2 > K − 1
2
Φ1. (10)
What Assumption 1 says is that in the case when principal 2 is the sole owner, it should be
worthwhile to undertake this project. Notice that when this condition holds, then for any ρ ∈ [0, 1],
and for any λ ∈ [λ2, λ1], the participation constraint of principal 1 will be non-empty. This is
because
ρΠ1(λ) + (1− ρ)Π2(λ)−K = λ
(
(ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)− 1
2
λ
)
Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1
≥ 1
2
(λ2)
2Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1 > 0.
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The inequality preceding the last is due to λ ∈ [λ2, λ1]. It should be pointed out that the partic-
ipation constraint of the second principal is ensured by this very same condition. Because that it
will be dealt later in greater detail, it suffices for now to mention that the participation constraint
of principal 1 already takes care of that of the second principal due to the following: When player
1 has opportunities to make strictly positive profits, then he would make sure that principal 2 gets
at least a payoff of K, ensuring his individual rationality.
2.3 Bargaining Over Implementable Contracts
Having determined the outcome and associated net returns, we may restrict attention to the bar-
gaining between the two principals in the first phase of the game.
The two principals will bargain over the choice of λ¯, and the set of admissible values must be in
[λ2, λ1]. If the principals cannot agree in that bargaining, the project cannot go ahead, and thus,
we assume each gets a return equal to their reserve value which is normalized to 0. Hence, the
bargaining set is
S = {(pi1, pi2) : pii ∈ [0,Πi(λ)], for some λ ∈ [λ2, λ1]}. (11)
The Pareto optimal6 frontier of S denoted by ∂S then is
∂S = {(pi1, pi2) : pii = Πi(λ), for some λ ∈ [λ2, λ1]} .
The following lemma establishes that (S,0) is a well defined and “nice” bargaining problem. More-
over, such a bargaining set is given in figure 1 for the case when λ1 = 3/4, λ2 = 1/4, Φ1 = 1, and
Φ2 = 2.
Lemma 2 S is non–empty, compact and convex. Moreover, ∂S is strictly concave.
Proof. Non–emptiness is trivial, because pi = (Π1(λ2),Π2(λ2)) is both in S. Moreover, since all
the variables are continuous, and [λ2, λ1] is compact, compactness of S follows.
Since showing convexity of S is a standard exercise, it suffices to prove that ∂S is strictly concave.
To that regard, let α ∈ (0, 1) and pi, pi′ ∈ ∂S with λ and λ′ such that pii = Πi(λ) and pi′i = Πi(λ′),
for all i. For a contradiction suppose that p˜i = αpi + (1 − α)pi′ is in ∂S. Thus, there exists λ˜ such
6By Pareto optimality we mean the regular, non–strict, one.
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that p˜ii = Πi(λ˜). Hence, due to the strict concavity of Πi, i = 1, 2, established in Lemma 1, we have
Πi(λ˜) = αΠi(λ) + (1− α)Πi(λ′) < Πi(αλ+(1− α)λ′), (12)
i = 1, 2. Finally, due to the same Lemma, we know that Π1 is strictly increasing, therefore,
inequality 12 implies λ˜ < α λ+(1 − α)λ′. The proof finishes, because the same inequality and Π2
being strictly decreasing implies λ˜ > α λ+(1− α)λ′, delivering the necessary contradiction.
These bargaining problems will be solved by the utilitarian solution concept. Please refer to
Thomson (1981) for a detailed analysis of this bargaining solution. That is, for (S,0), and for any
given weights θ, (1− θ) ∈ [0, 1], piθ ∈ S˜ is the θ–utilitarian bargaining solution of (S,0) if and only
if
(piθ1, pi
θ
2) = N (S,0; θ) ≡ argmax(pi1,pi2)∈S θpi1 + (1− θ)pi2. (13)
Note that by Lemma 2, there exists a unique solution to (S,0) for all θ ∈ [0, 1], thus N (S,0; θ) is
a function. Moreover, it should be pointed out that we treat θ ∈ [0, 1] as exogenously given. For
notational purposes, we let λθ be defined by Πi(λ
θ) = piθi , for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 3 For every θ ∈ [0, 1], N (S,0; θ) is a function, and λθ ∈ [λ2, λ1] is strictly increasing in θ
and is uniquely determined as follows:
λθ = θ λ1+(1− θ)λ2 . (14)
Proof. The required conditions for the existence of the utilitarian bargaining solution fθ have
been shown to be satisfied. Namely, S is compact and convex, 0 ∈ S, and by Assumption 1, there
exists some s ∈ S with sj > 0, for j = 1, 2. Therefore, for any θ ∈ [0, 1] we have N (S,0; θ) 6= ∅.
Moreover, since ∂S is strictly concave, N (S,0; θ) is a function. By the Pareto efficiency axiom for
the utilitarian bargaining solutions, N (S,0; θ) ∈ ∂S, for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that the definition of
∂S implies that there is some λθ ∈ [λ2, λ1] such that N (S,0; θ) = (piθ1, piθ2) = (Π1(λθ),Π2(λθ)). This
λθ is unique because Πi are one-to-one (strictly monotone) functions of λ on [λ2, λ1] by Lemma 1.
Moreover, solving the following maximization problem with first order conditions
max
λ∈[λ2,λ1]
θ
(
1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ1−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
+ (1− θ)
(
1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ2−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
.
and noticing that the objective function is linear, and by Lemma 2 the boundary of the constraint
set is strictly concave; and further noting that λ1−λ2 > 0, delivers the conclusion.
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Thus, given (ρ,R), that the principal 1 offered to principal 2 who accepted and supplied the
capital investment of K, the net returns to principals are Π1(ρ,R) ≡ ρΠ1(λρ)−R, and Π2(ρ,R) ≡
(1− ρ)Π2(λρ) + R. It should be pointed out that by Lemma 1, Π1(ρ,R) is strictly increasing in ρ,
and Π2(ρ,R) strictly decreasing.
2.4 Entrepreneur’s Optimal Offer To the Investor
For (ρ,R) to be participatory for principal 2, who supplies the capital investment needed for the
project, we need to have Π2(ρ,R) ≥ K. Thus, the program that the investor, principal 1, has
to solve is max(ρ,R)Π1(ρ,R) subject to the participation constraints of the two principals, i.e. (1)
Π1(ρ,R) ≥ 0, and (2) Π2(ρ,R) ≥ K. That is, the entrepreneur solves the following problem:
max
(ρ,R)
ρΠ1(λ
ρ)−R (15)
subject to
ρΠ1(λ
ρ)−R ≥ 0
(1− ρ)Π2(λρ) +R ≥ K.
Let (ρ?, R?) solve this problem. Noticing that Π1(ρ,R) is strictly increasing in ρ, implies that
the participation constraint of principal 2 will hold with equality at the solution (ρ?, R?). Thus,
ignoring the participation constraint of principal 1 for now, (15) is reduced to
max
(ρ,R)
ρΠ1 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2) + (1− ρ)Π2 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)−K. (16)
First notice that due to Lemma 1, the objective of this maximization is continuous in ρ. Moreover,
principal 1 is solving a non-trivial utilitarian planner’s problem where the weights assigned to the
agents must be interpreted as their share of the project.
The following Proposition characterizes the solutions to (15):
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique (ρ?, R?) solving (15).
Moreover, they are characterized as follows:
1. If 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K, then ρ? = 1, and R? = K.
2. If 1
2
Φ1 < K, then ρ
? is the maximum real number in [0, 1] solving
(1− ρ?) (ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1, (17)
and R? = ρ?
(
1
2
Φ1
)
.
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Proof. When Assumption 1 holds constraint set is non-empty and compact, thus, due to the
continuity of the objective function of 16 there exists a solution.7
When 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K Because that Π1(λ1)−Π2(λ2) = (1/2)Φ2(λ21−λ22) > 0 since λ1 > λ2, the optimal
solution would be so that principal 1 would be the sole owner of the project, and on expected terms
would pay off the capital investment borrowed from the second principal in full using only the
monetary returns from the project. Notice that the solution in this case is unique.
Suppose 1
2
Φ1 < K. Let A(ρ) be defined by
B(ρ) = (1− ρ?) (ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
)
Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1.
It should be noticed that for any ρ ∈ [0, 1], the participation constraint of the second principal holds
whenever B(ρ) ≥ 0. Note that B(1) = 1
2
Φ1 − K < 0. Moreover, B(0) = 12 λ22Φ2 − K + 12Φ1 > 0
due to Assumption 1. Consequently, by the mean value theorem, there exists ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that
B(ρ) = 0. But the key observation needed is that
Π1 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)− Π2 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2) = (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2) (λ1−λ2)Φ2 > 0.
Thus, in the optimal solution principal 2 should get as low as possible shares of the project, there-
fore, in the optimal contract he collects all the monetary returns from the project. Moreover, the
remaining utility needed from the individual rationality constraint of principal 2 to be satisfied, is
supplied to him by allocating as low as possible shares to him. 8 Note that this arrangement is
unique.
In figure 2 the graph of B(ρ) for given ρ is displayed for the following situations: λ1 = 0.75, λ2 =
0.30. The lowest curve happens when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.045 = 1
2
λ22, i.e. when Assumption 1 holds with
equality. The second lowest curve occurs for
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03, and finally the highest for
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01.
In order to display more details about the solution in the commitment case, consider the following
example. Let λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30, and for the value of
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
we consider two levels 0.03 and 0.01.
7Notice that Assumption 1 holds trivially when 12Φ1 ≥ K.
8Alternatively, one can consider the objective function that Principal 1 paces:
H(ρ) =
[
(ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)
(
ρ
(
λ1−12 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ))
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
λ2−12 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ))
))]
Φ2 −K + 12Φ1,
subject to B(ρ) ≥ 0. Because that ∂H∂ρ = ρ (λ1−λ2)2 + λ2 (λ1−λ2) > 0, we must choose the highest real number in
[0,1], such that A(ρ) = 0.
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In figure 3 H(ρ) (the definition is in footnote 8) and B(ρ) are given. Recall that principal 1 is
maximizing H(ρ) subject to B(ρ) ≥ 0, and H(0) = B(0). Thus, the solutions when K− 12Φ1
Φ2
equals
0.03 and 0.01 are given in that figure and are labeled as ρ(1) and ρ(2), respectively.
3 Collusion Between The Entrepreneur And The Agent
Suppose that the entrepreneur has the opportunity to collude with the agent operating the project.
Indeed, for simplicity we will assume that principal 1 has the option to convince an agent by using
a hidden side contract to implement λ 6= λρ? even if he were not to own the whole project. This
can be motivated as follows. After all, the entrepreneur is the party who came up with this project.
Therefore it is conceivable that he has more access than principal 2 to the project, who we assumed
is a financial investor not necessarily capable of understanding the nature of the project.
The timing of the game essentially is the same, with a difference happening towards the very
end of the game:
t = 1 : Principal 1 offers (ρ,R) to principal 2 for him to supply K, and principal 2 accepts or rejects.
If principal 2 rejects the offer, the game ends, otherwise, it continues.
t = 2 : With bargaining weights given by their share of the project, the principals bargain over the
feasible allocation of resources for the project. This determines a level of λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] that the
principals have agreed upon.
t = 3 : Given λ¯, the principals determine the optimal contract, and the entrepreneur offers it to the
agent;
t = 4 : Principal 1 can offer a hidden side contract to the agent, in which all resulting additional costs
have to be covered by Principal 1.
t = 5 : The agent chooses whether or not he should accept one of these two offers, and exert the effort
level desired. And, the observable and verifiable state is realized.
t = 6 : Finally, the entrepreneur makes the payments to the agent, and has the option of doing so in
a way that the investor cannot observe or verify.
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It should be pointed out that because the side contract needs to remain hidden, extra payments to
the agent cannot be reflected to the investor. In order for the investor not to infer the true allocation
of resources for the project, the entrepreneur needs to possess the ability of compensating the agent
secretly. Thus, some payments to the agent (made by the entrepreneur) cannot be observable
and/or verifiable by the investor.9 Thus, having agreed on an allocation described by λ¯ and on the
fraction of shares given by ρ, the investor observes (and can verify) the state and pays only (1− ρ)
of the costs resulting at λ¯. Otherwise, he would easily infer that the allocation is not given by λ¯.
Consequently, the net payoff to the entrepreneur when he deviates to λ is his gross benefit from
implementing the project at λ, minus all the cost of implementing the project at λ, plus the (1− ρ)
portion of the costs resulting from λ¯. Thus, the investor continues to pay his share of the costs as
if the project is being implemented at λ¯, and additional costs are covered by the entrepreneur.
It needs to be emphasized that investor’s ability of observing (and verifying) the state is not
sufficient to infer that the entrepreneur has deviated to some other allocation. This is because, the
investor does not observe the real mean, but rather stochastic outcomes of the project. That is,
when the entrepreneur deviates to an allocation λ not equal to λ¯ (the level that they have agreed
upon), the investor still thinks that his average return is given by λ¯, and not by λ.
Recall that the gross benefit of the entrepreneur is given by B1(λ) = µ1(t1) + µ2(t2)λ1 . Using
the optimal efforts given in (2), the optimal contract parameters in (5), (6), and the definition of
Φl in (8) we find
B1(λ) = Φ1 + Φ2 λλ1 . (18)
Cost incurred to principals when some λ is implemented is derived by employing the facts used in
the derivation of (18), and the cost function present in (4). It is
κ(λ) =
1
2
(Φ1 + Φ2 λ
2). (19)
Thus,
Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) = ρB1(λ)− κ(λ) + (1− ρ)κ(λ¯).
Plugging in the definitions, and rearranging we find
Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) = ρ(1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ1−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
− 1
2
(1− ρ) Φ2
(
λ2− (λ¯)2) . (20)
9On the other hand, the hidden contract between the entrepreneur and the agent is binding because each of them
can verify its ingredients.
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For a given (ρ, λ¯) the partial derivative of Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) with respect to λ is given by
∂Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯)
∂ λ
= Φ2 (ρ λ1−λ) . (21)
Hence, Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) is strictly concave, having a unique solution at ρ λ1.
Next we display that in the case when 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 1 hold, the deviation of the
entrepreneur from λρ
?
(as described in Proposition 1) to ρ? λ1 is strictly profitable. Notice that
when 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K, ρ? = 1, thus, λρ? = λ1. Therefore, in that case there are no profitable deviations
for the entrepreneur.
Proposition 2 Suppose that 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 1 holds, and let (ρ
?, R?) be as given in
Proposition 1. Then, under collusion principal 1 has a strictly profitable deviation.
Proof. The optimal deviation of principal 1 at given levels of ρ? and λρ
?
would be one that
maximizes (20) subject to λ > 0. But we know that (21) implies ρ? λ1 maximizes his objective.
Further, due to 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 1, we know that ρ
? < 1. Thus, ρ? λ1 < ρ
? λ1+(1 −
ρ?)λ2 = λ
ρ? . Let the payoffs from any deviation λ ∈ [ρ? λ1, ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2] be given by D(λ) ≡
Π1
(
λ | ρ?, λρ?) − Π1 (λρ? | ρ?, λρ?). Because that Π1 (λ | ρ?, λρ?) is strictly decreasing for all λ ∈
(ρ? λ1, λ
ρ? ], and D(λρ
?
) = 0, and Π1
(
λρ
? | ρ?, λρ?) is constant in λ, we conclude that for all λ ∈
[ρ? λ1, λ
ρ?), D(λ) > 0.
3.1 Optimal Arrangement With Collusion
In this section the important feature is that principal 2 knows that principal 1 and the agent
can collude via a hidden contract between the two. Thus, when accepting principal 1’s offer,
(ρ,R) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, K], principal 2 knows that the point that will be implemented, λ(ρ) must solve
the following problem:
λ(ρ) ∈ argmaxλ∈[0,1]Π1 (λ | ρ, λ(ρ)) ≡ ρ
(
1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ1−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
− 1
2
(1− ρ) Φ2
(
λ2− (λ(ρ))2) .
(22)
Because that it was already shown in the proof of Proposition 2 that Π1 (λ | ρ, λ(ρ)) is continuous
and strictly concave in λ, it can easily be proven that the unique solution to (22) for any given
(ρ,R) is
λ(ρ) = ρ λ1 . (23)
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Consequently, the problem that principal 1 has to solve at the beginning of the game in order
to identify the optimal offer that needs to be made to principal 2, is:
max
(ρ,R)
ρΠ1(ρ λ1)−R, (24)
subject to
(1− ρ)Π2(ρ λ1) +R ≥ K,
ρΠ1(ρ λ1)−R ≥ 0.
For what follows, first we will derive a condition that will ensure that the constraint set of this
maximization problem is not empty. Let,
A(ρ) ≡ (1− ρ) (ρ λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ λ1)
)
Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1.
Because that principal 1 always obtains strictly higher payoffs from the project than the principal
2, as was done in the proof of Proposition 1, all the monetary returns from the project, 1
2
Φ1, will be
allocated to the second principal. Thus, it can be observed that the participation constraint of the
second principal holds whenever A(ρ) ≥ 0. Therefore, the question is whether or not there exists a
ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that A(ρ) ≥ 0.
Note that A(ρ) < 0 whenever ρ < 0. Moreover, for ρ > 1 high enough A(ρ) > 0. On the other
hand, A(1) = 1
2
Φ1 −K = A(0). Thus, the local maximum, ρ˜ must be in (0, 1). The condition we
impose to guarantee that there exists a ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that A(ρ) ≥ 0, requires A(ρ˜) ≥ 0. That
is why we consider ∂A(ρ)
∂ρ
= 0, and (as figure 4 displays) we have two roots, the lower one the
local maximum, and the higher one the local minimum. In Assumption 2 we require that the local
maximum providing ρ, the lower root of ∂A(ρ)
∂ρ
= 0 (that we labeled as ρ˜) is such that A(ρ˜) ≥ 0.
Because then, there exits ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that the participation constraint of the second player is
nonempty.
Assumption 2 Let λ1, λ2, K,Φ1,Φ2 be such that A(ρ˜) ≥ 0 where
ρ˜ ≡ 1
3λ1
(
2λ2+λ1−
√(
4λ22−2λ1 λ2+λ21
)) ∈ (0, 1).
It is worthwhile to note that Assumption 1 fails to guarantee the participation constraint of the
second principal. This can be observed in figure 4 which displays A(ρ) < 0 for ρ ∈ [0, 1] in the
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case when Assumption 1 holds: λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22. But when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01, then the same figure displays that participation constraint of the second principal
holds for some ρ.
The importance of Assumption 2 is that when it does not hold, then the participation constraint
of the second principal cannot hold for any ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, even though Assumption 1 holds, if
Assumption 2 does not hold the market collapses, i.e. the project cannot be financed by the investor.
This situation happens for values λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22. Note that
then Assumption 1 holds, but (as figure 4 displays) Assumption 2 does not. Therefore, even though
the solution under the commitment case is ρ(1) (as was shown in figure 3), the market collapses and
the project is not financed by the second principal because his participation constraint cannot be
satisfied at no ρ ∈ [0, 1].
However, when Assumption 2 holds, the solution can be found as follows. Consider the values
λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22. It should be noticed that both Assumptions
hold at these values. Now principal 1 is maximizing
G(ρ) = ρ (ρ λ1)
(
λ1−1
2
(ρ λ1)
)
+ (1− ρ) (ρ λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ λ1)
)
− K −
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
,
subject to A(ρ) ≥ 0. Both G and A are depicted in figure 5. Note that A is equal to 0 in two spots.
But because that
∂G
∂ρ
= ρ (λ1−λ2)2 + λ2 (λ1−ρ λ2) > 0,
the solution ρ(3) is the higher of the two roots of A(ρ) = 0.
The following Proposition will characterize the solutions to (24):
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then:
1. If 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K, then the solution (ρO, RO) is given by ρO = 1, and RO = K.
2. If 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 2 does not hold, then the market collapses, and the project is not
financed by the second player.
3. If 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 2 holds, then the solution (ρ
O, RO) is such that ρO is the maximum
real number in [0, 1] which solves
(1− ρO) (ρO λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρO λ1)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1, (25)
and RO = ρO
(
1
2
Φ1
)
.
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Proof. Note that for (ρO, RO), the individual rationality constraint of principal 1 is satisfied,
because (ρO λ1)
2 (1 − 1/2ρO)Φ2 > 0. Moreover, due to the rest of the proof being very similar to
that of Proposition 1, it is omitted.
3.2 Collusion versus Commitment
We have some tools to visualize and compare the shareholding structure in collusion and commit-
ment cases. Let us consider the only non-trivial case where 1
2
Φ1 < K, and Assumption 1, and
Assumption 2 hold. Then, we have shown that ρ? is the maximum real number in [0, 1] solving
(1− ρ?) (ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1,
and that ρO is the maximum real number in [0, 1] which solves
(1− ρO) (ρO λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρO λ1)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1.
We can rewrite the former equation as ∗(ρ?) = C, and the latter as O(ρO) = C, where ∗(ρ), and
O(ρ) are third degree polynomial functions in ρ, and C = K−
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
. ρ? is the greater of the two real
numbers in [0,1] making ∗(ρ) equal to C, and ρO is the greater of the two real numbers in [0,1]
making O(ρ) equal to C.
To visualize the relationship between ρO, and ρ? we will examine the relationship between the
roots of O(ρ), and ∗(ρ). The real numbers solving ∗(ρ) = 0 are − λ2
λ1−λ2 ,
λ2
λ1−λ2 , and 1; whereas the
real numbers solving O(ρ) = 0 are 0, 2λ2
λ1
, and 1.
We will consider three cases. The first case is when λ2 >
λ1
2
. It is straightforward to show that,
in that case, the relationship between the roots is given by − λ2
λ1−λ2 < 0 < 1 <
2λ2
λ1
< λ2
λ1−λ2 , or
r∗1 < (r
O
1 = 0) < (r
∗
2 = r
O
2 = 1) < r
O
3 < r
∗
3,
where r∗ are the roots of ∗(ρ), etc. The second case is when λ2 < λ12 . In that case, the relationship
becomes − λ2
λ1−λ2 < 0 <
λ2
λ1−λ2 <
2λ2
λ1
< 1, or
r∗1 < (r
O
1 = 0) < r
∗
2 < r
O
2 < (r
∗
3 = r
O
3 = 1).
The last case is when λ2 =
λ1
2
. The relationship is
(−1 = r∗1) < (rO1 = 0) < (r∗2 = rO2 = r∗3 = rO3 = 1).
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These relationships provide the general picture of the problem at hand. However, it fails to
force an exact relation between ρO, and ρ?. That is, by changing the specifics of the problem, we
can have ρO < ρ?, and ρO > ρ? while we are keeping the relationship between the roots.
Now, we will consider an example. Let λ2 = 2, and λ1 = 3. Hence, ∗(ρ) = (1− ρ)(ρ+2)(1− ρ2),
and O(ρ) = (1 − ρ)(3ρ)(2 − 3
2
ρ). The roots satisfy (−2 = r∗1) < (rO1 = 0) < (r∗2 = rO2 = 1) < (rO3 =
4
3
) < (r∗3 = 2). This alignment allows, with differen C’s, different orderings for ρ
O, and ρ?. For
C = 0.25, 0.848 = ρ? < ρO = 0.863; whereas for C = 0.95, 0.494 = ρ? > ρO = 0.488.
4 Concluding Remarks
We wish to point out the fact that our research tries to explain the existing issue of shareholding by
investors and shows the consequences of the structure of the issue. However, the fact that investors
do not have effective control rights remains a problem. Typically, investors do not possess mecha-
nisms to control how their funds are used. Thus, we have a mechanism design problem. Therefore,
a future avenue for research is to attempt to devise mechanisms to force corporations pursue the
rights of their investors. Once there are such mechanisms, external funding of corporations becomes
easier.
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Figure 1: Bargaining set S, for λ1 = 3/4, λ2 = 1/4, Φ1 = 1, and Φ2 = 2
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Figure 2: The graph of B(ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30, K−
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22 is
given in the solid (the highest) curve. The second highest one occurs when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03. Finally,
the lowest one of them happens when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.045 = 1
2
λ22, i.e. when Assumption 1 holds with
equality.
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Figure 3: The graphs of H(ρ) and B(ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30, K−
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 (the
solid curve) and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03 (the curve with the dots). The solutions when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
equals 0.03 and 0.01 are given in that figure and are labeled as ρ(1) and ρ(2), respectively.
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Figure 4: The graph of A(ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30, K−
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22 is
given in the solid curve. Whereas, the same situation when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 is depicted in the curve
with the dots.
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Figure 5: The solution for the no-commitment case for values λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 <
0.045 = 1
2
λ22. G(ρ) and A(ρ) are depicted, and the solution is ρ(3).
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